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ABSTRACT
This paper outlines an account of political realism as a form of ideology 
critique. We defend the normative edge of this critical-theoretic 
project against the common charge that there is a problematic trade-
off between a theory’s groundedness in facts about the political status 
quo and its ability to envisage radical departures from the status quo. 
To overcome that problem, we combine insights from theories of 
legitimacy by Bernard Williams and other realists, Critical Theory, and 
analytic epistemological and metaphysical theories of cognitive bias, 
ideology and social construction. The upshot is an account of realism 
as empirically informed critique of social and political phenomena. We 
reject a sharp divide between descriptive and normative theory, and 
so provide an alternative to the anti-empiricism of some approaches 
to Critical Theory as well as to the complacency towards existing 
power structures found within liberal realism, let alone mainstream 
normative political philosophy, liberal or otherwise.
Introduction
The accusation of status quo bias is a major obstacle in realism’s path. Even theorists who 
are friendly to the realist enterprise express worries as to the approach’s ability to radically 
criticise the reality to which, in some important sense, any realism worth its name must be 
tied. When it comes to prescribing alternative political scenarios this problem becomes, pre-
dictably, even more pressing. Crudely, there appears to be a problematic trade-off between 
a theory’s groundedness in facts about the status quo and its ability to consistently envisage 
radical departures from the status quo. Or so the criticism goes.
In this paper, we respond to that criticism by outlining an account of realism as ideology 
critique. More specifically, we investigate one avenue of realist defence against the status 
quo bias accusation: the idea that, if an empirically informed analysis of the status quo is 
guided by an appropriate theory of ideology, it can yield a normative indictment of the 
status quo and, in some cases, even an account of a desirable alternative state of affairs. 
Here, the challenge is to make criticism of ideology compatible with the realist rejection of 
moral principles external to the context and problem in question. And so we see an affinity 
between the realist project and the long-standing tradition of ‘immanent critique’ in Critical 
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Theory. Moralist critique of institutions or practices can be internal in the sense it is still 
committed to articulating the normative commitments that ostensibly underpin those insti-
tutions and practices (think of the enormous liberal literature on what kinds of first-order 
political principles most truly express liberalism’s normative commitments). Realist or imma-
nent critique, on the other hand, seeks to transcend, transform, or even subvert those com-
mitments without thereby relying on further, external moral standards. Put differently, 
immanent critique is internal to the political context without being internal to the ideology that 
underpins that context. In our specific account of realist ideology critique, this critical stand-
point will be reached by relying on epistemic rather than moral commitments.
To make space for such an understanding of critique, we will reject some of the dichot-
omies that have pervaded recent debates about the self-conception of political theory, 
especially those between normative and descriptive theory, and between realism and rad-
icalism. To wit, this involves rethinking the relationship of political theory to its political and 
social context in terms of the sources of normativity, the role of self-reflection, and the 
purposes of theorising.
On our understanding, realism aims both at action-orienting normative evaluation and 
at diagnostic critique. That is why we question the division between normative and descrip-
tive forms of political theorising. In order to achieve this dual aim of diagnosis and evaluation, 
realist political theory needs to incorporate a wider understanding of what constitutes a 
normative approach besides making prescriptions. Ideology critique bases its normative 
evaluations on the diagnosis of specific problems, and so offers one way to challenge the 
aspiration of critical distance via an ‘uncluttered view’ (Rawls, 2005, p. 20), which has been 
very influential in post-Rawlsian political theory. An ‘uncluttered view’ embodies the prob-
lems of excessive abstraction and idealisation (Mills, 2005). What is more, criticism of ideology 
is committed to self-reflection with regard to how normative and epistemic concerns are 
intertwined, thus it addresses the political import of political theory itself. So we contend 
that the combination of realism and criticism of ideology opens up the space for rethinking 
the potential of realism as a distinctive approach to political theory.
We begin the first section with a brief, working characterisation of realism, and we set 
out the status quo bias charge. We then discuss the most developed response to this charge 
in current realist literature, namely Bernard Williams’ ‘Critical Theory Principle’. We argue that, 
while the Critical Theory Principle is a pioneering step in the right direction, it does not 
contain a sufficiently developed account of ideology to succeed. In the second section, then, 
we spell out the desiderata for a successful realist account of ideology. On that basis, we 
outline such an account by combining elements from recent Frankfurt School-inspired 
Critical Theory and from contemporary analytic epistemological and metaphysical discus-
sions of ideology and social construction. The upshot is an understanding of criticism of 
ideology, which delivers tools for meeting realist commitments to diagnosing the patterns 
of power exercise, while thus preparing the basis for a non-moral criticism of the social and 
political order. In the third section, we summarise our argument and canvass a few questions 
for further work on realism as ideology critique.
Realism and the status quo
Let us start by distinguishing between two incompatible Idealtypen of realism found in the 
growing literature on the topic. On one view, realism is merely a subset of nonideal theory. 
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The idea is that realists ‘are looking for principles which are likely to be effective here and 
now’ (Valentini, 2012, p. 660). So realism can be a distinctive view only insofar as it picks out 
a specific subset of feasibility constraints (e.g. those to do with power) that are sometimes 
overlooked by mainstream, Rawlsian nonideal theory (Baderin, 2014). Or perhaps realism 
can bypass reference to an ideal when devising the nonideal, along the lines of Sen’s 
‘comparative’ approach to justice (Raekstad, 2015). On another, more classical view,1 realism 
breaks with contemporary anglophone political theory’s moralistic tendency to proceed as 
a branch of applied ethics (Geuss, 2008, Williams, 2005). Here, the general idea is that the 
sources of political normativity are not – or not exclusively – to be found in pre-political moral 
commitments, but in a form of normativity inherent to politics (Jubb & Rossi, 2015; Rossi & 
Sleat, 2014; Sleat, 2014). Hybrid views exist as well (Galston, 2010; Hall, 2016; Jubb, 2015).
Adjudicating the relative merits of each of those approaches is beyond the scope of this 
paper. At any rate, given the question at hand – whether realism has a built-in status quo 
bias – it will be natural to take as our reference point the more classical conception of realism, 
the one that sets it apart from nonideal theory. There are two reasons for this choice. First, 
whatever the attractions of nonideal theory, it is explicitly anchored in the status quo, insofar 
as it is primarily concerned with balancing normative aspirations against feasibility con-
straints. That is not to say that a series of feasible incremental changes (‘transitional’ nonideal 
theory) can never lead to profound social and political transformations. The point is just that 
nonideal theory largely wears its relationship to the status quo on its sleeve, so there can be 
no general answer to the question as to whether a whole family of nonideal theories has a 
bias-inducing relationship to the status quo. Each nonideal theory will (or at least should) 
furnish its own answer, through its account of exactly how to accommodate feasibility con-
straints. Second, and more importantly, the classical view of realism presents a potentially 
more rewarding challenge. It is not particularly surprising that one can call for a radical 
transformation of politics by invoking moral commitments that sit outside of politics (even 
when those commitments have to be implemented via a series of feasibility-conscious steps). 
Indeed, realists argue that moralist radicalism is just too easy, or a category mistake (Rossi 
2010, 2015, 2016).2 Such moralist radicalism is typically not interested in connecting to the 
specific motivations and patterns of action as they are mediated through the understanding 
of politics in a particular context. This lack of connection can lead to pernicious actions in 
the name of the prescriptions of moralist radicals that distort their intentions (if not their 
principles), or, if moral radicalism altogether fails to connect to its addressees, lead to little 
practical importance. The more probing challenge for a concretely action-guiding political 
theory is to start the generation of its normative purchase from within the understanding(s) 
of politics to be found in the context(s) of action in question. This involves examining the 
presuppositions of any normative claims, including those that seek to claim that their validity 
is pre-political, i.e. not tied to the specificities of the context. This is why we seek to show 
that realists can call for radical change while drawing on resources immanent in, rather than 
external to, the political practice they criticise.
But why, exactly, is classical realism routinely accused of status quo bias? Here is one 
(somewhat sympathetic) critic’s take on the problem:
… if, as realists, we place emphasis on historically constant factors which we regard as constraints 
on political possibility – and if our main objection to the liberal mainstream is that it overlooks 
these factors – then our realism will inevitably tend to nudge us towards a greater acceptance 
of the status quo … Of course, it is logically quite possible to emphasise ‘stability’ (rather than 
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‘justice’ or ‘equality’) as a political aspiration, and at the same time to call for far-reaching social 
change, or even revolution, as the means to that end. But if – as I would suggest is the case – 
realists generally do no such thing, but rather preserve the areas where mainstream liberal theory 
affirms the status quo (e.g. its acceptance of the basic framework of liberal democracy) whilst 
eliminating the points where liberal demands most visibly exceed what is actually realised within 
that framework (e.g. by prescribing a significantly greater degree of material and social equal-
ity), then realism is a de facto conservative force in political theory. (Finlayson, 2015, pp. 7–8)3
Note that this is not simply a denunciation of excessive attention paid to feasibility 
constraints. Though that passage arguably collapses the distinction between nonideal-
theoretic and classical realism, it latches on to some important features of the latter: classical 
realists do place emphasis on constants in the realm of politics, most notably on features 
often wished away by moralist theory such as coercive power relations (Sleat, 2014). Within 
realism, though, coercion is best understood not primarily as a feasibility constraint, but 
rather as a constitutive feature of any political practice. Feasibility constraints are not 
unwelcome hindrances. For realists, coercion is not an obstacle to be removed or bypassed. 
The question of achieving political results without coercion (e.g. through consent) is ill posed. 
The art of politics just is, to a large extent, the art of coercing with good judgement – of 
distinguishing between good and bad coercion. So the problem here is whether this realist 
understanding of politics is tantamount to status quo bias. More generally, the problem is 
whether realists’ commitment to working within the parameters of a sphere of politics with 
its own normative standards limits their political imagination.
First, as long as realists engage their moralist (liberal or not) opponents in discussions 
about the nature of the political and especially if their characterisations are based on assertions, 
e.g. of the conflictuality of politics, the limitation of the political imagination is a plausible 
impression. Such attempts at getting an accurate picture of the political (McNay, 2014) and 
then issuing prescriptions that meet this characterisation are questionable, and do not 
warrant claims to a greater degree of prescriptive and descriptive fit, nor a claim to settling 
ontological questions of what is real (Little, 2015). If anything, this issue marks a starting 
position for understanding how politics is a thick evaluative concept (Jubb & Rossi, 2015) 
– and even for this goal realists could consult sources that actually study how political speech 
and action can be distinguished from non-political speech and action (Freeden, 2013).
Second, the source of normativity does not necessarily prefigure the stance of a political 
theory to its political context. Moralism can be connected to radical political goals (think 
of utopian animal rights ethicists) or may be status quo supporting, as Geuss (2005) argues 
for Rawlsianism. Likewise, realism may support a broad range of positions towards the 
status quo.4
While some general, in-principle defences of the emancipatory or radical potential of 
realism have been put forward (e.g. Geuss, 2010a; Prinz, 2015a, Rossi 2010, 2015), Bernard 
Williams’ theory of legitimacy5 remains the main systematic attempt to explain how one 
may tackle a classic problem of normative political theory within a realist framework. So for 
our purposes, Williams’ theory of legitimacy is an explorative exercise into how one may 
criticise a set of political practices or institutions while remaining committed to evaluating 
them with standards internal to political practices themselves.
Williams’ first move is to delimitate the sphere of politics by identifying a ‘first political 
question’, namely ‘the securing of order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of coop-
eration.’ (2005, p. 3). But, unlike in Hobbes, solving the first political question is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for a polity’s legitimacy. To achieve legitimacy, a polity must 
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meet what Williams calls the ‘Basic Legitimation Demand’ (BLD): ‘Meeting the BLD can be 
equated with there being an “acceptable” solution to the first political question.’ (2005, p. 4). 
In order for a solution to the political question to be “acceptable”, those subject to it have to 
be able to make sense of it as such a solution.
For Williams, ‘making sense’ is ‘a category of historical understanding, […] a hermeneutical 
category’ (2005, p. 11) which assesses whether the legitimation being used can be under-
stood within the context (including its concepts) to which it is addressed. More precisely, 
however, the idea is about checking whether an ‘intelligible order of authority makes sense 
to us as such a structure’ (2005, p. 10) which ‘requires […], that there is a legitimation offered 
which goes beyond the assertion of power’. Williams adds that ‘we can recognise such a 
thing because in the light of the historical and cultural circumstances […] it [makes sense] 
to us as a legitimation’ (2005, p. 11). This qualification underscores Williams’ commitment to 
contextualism. However, it also invites worries about the standing of the idea of ‘making 
sense’ to evaluate rationales of legitimation.
This idea relies on ‘our’ ability to differentiate legitimations based on assertions of power 
from legitimations for the endorsement of which there are reasons other than their hold of 
power over us. To flesh out this distinction and render it politically viable, Williams introduces 
his ‘Critical Theory Principle’ (CTP): ‘the acceptance of a justification does not count if the accept-
ance has been produced by the coercive power which is supposedly being justified’ (2002, 
pp. 219–232, 2005, p. 6). For Williams, ‘the difficulty with [this principle], of making good on 
claims of false consciousness and the like, lies in deciding what counts as having been “pro-
duced by” coercive power in the relevant sense’ (2005, p. 6). This commits Williams to looking 
at the actual beliefs of people, who accept the legitimacy of a regime only because they have 
not come to realise yet that there are no other reasons to accept it as legitimate than the power 
of this regime over them to accept it as legitimate (Williams, 2002, p. 231), not simply as they 
are now, but from the point of view of their transformation (and not simply as they are now):
If we are supposing that the background is simply these people’s current set of beliefs, then 
almost anything will pass the [Critical Theory Principle] test (except perhaps some cases of 
extreme internal incoherence). If we suppose, on the other hand, an entirely external frame of 
reference, then nothing very distinctive is achieved by the test. We need a schema by which we 
start with the people’s current beliefs and imagine their going through a process of criticism, a 
process in which the test plays a significant part. (2002, p. 227)
The schema which Williams endorses and which helps with clarifying what ‘counts as 
having been “produced by” coercive power in the relevant sense’ (2005, p. 6) is based on an 
idea which has been called ‘reflective unacceptability’ (Geuss, 1981, pp. 55–65). This entails 
encouraging a process of reflection in people on whether they would still hold on to their 
beliefs (directly or indirectly about the legitimacy of the regime), once they had realised how 
they came to hold them. This process will lead to context-sensitive evaluations based on 
reasons actually available to the relevant agents. However, while the Critical Theory Principle 
enables Williams to offer some protection against internalised oppression ‘making sense’ 
and passing as legitimate, this arguably comes at the price of a tension with Williams’ realist 
commitments. Williams’ contextualism could be taken to imply that he seeks to develop 
criteria for legitimacy without recourse to a framework of justification based on moral criteria 
unmediated by the particular political context. This does not imply that Williams rejects 
moral criteria per se, but rather that he rejects criteria for legitimacy that are ‘doubly moral’, 
i.e. moral in substantive content and moral in terms of the reasons why they are brought 
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forward. Williams rejects the latter sense of ‘moral’ for at least two reasons: Firstly, he views 
the demand for legitimation as initiated primarily by political, not moral considerations 
(Williams, 2005, pp. 3–6). Secondly, given the conditions of pluralism which obtain in modern 
societies, it would be difficult to individuate moral criteria that can hover above the political 
fray without undermining said pluralism (see Schaub, 2012, pp. 445–447). If this distinction 
is applied to his discussion of the Critical Theory Principle, the question is if the moral criteria 
that are introduced are sufficiently mediated through the political context. Concretely, moral 
criteria enter the Critical Theory Principle test in through Williams’ morally charged assess-
ment of the situation in which the state fails the test as one of ‘injustice’ (Williams, 2002, p. 
231). This assessment arguably relies on an idea about the moral standing of agents, which 
is unjustly violated through the abuse of power. This could be linked to the understanding 
of ‘power as right’, which holds that authority only springs from power if power is exercised 
in accordance to moral and legal right (Hindess, 1996), irrespective of the specificities of the 
context.
This assessment of ‘injustice’ could also be viewed to connect to the moral ideal of auton-
omy, which Williams might have more or less accidentally brought in from Critical Theory 
when constructing the Critical Theory Principle. This is particularly visible in Williams’ hope 
that the Critical Theory Principle help the disadvantaged realise the ‘most basic sense of 
freedom, that of not being in the power of another’ (2002, p. 231). This seems to imply a near 
total lack of freedom in a situation in which the polity fails the Critical Theory Principle test 
– perhaps a way to displace the question of whether the mere fact of a coercively generated 
belief automatically disqualifies it from providing legitimacy. But the move may seem rather 
quick. It may be a problematic assumption about the totality of power typical of key texts 
of Critical Theory and the early Foucault (see Honneth, 1993). Williams’ hope, even on a 
minimalist construal, could then be seen as receiving some of its appeal from the moral ideal 
of autonomy, especially in cases where ‘being in the power of another’ is not a matter of 
physical captivity but rather a limitation of the (mental, social etc.) development of the per-
sons in question – a matter of ideology’s ability to induce ‘voluntary servitude’ (Rosen, 1996).
Arguably, this interpretation is in tension with Williams’ understanding of the political 
(rather than moral) value of liberty (2005, chapters 6 and 7). Within Williams’ realism, the 
injustice might be viewed to refer to the fact that the abuse of power makes it – in the long 
run – impossible for those suffering from it to enjoy the benefits of politics in the full sense 
of the term. Those benefits at least entail that the first question of politics – the ‘securing of 
order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of cooperation’ (2005, p. 3) – is answered. 
More precisely, the way out of the problem would be to stress the work done by the very 
concept of politics. Raw domination of the sort endured by the Helots in Sparta just isn’t 
politics, and this is a conceptual rather than a moral claim. (Hall, 2015; Sagar, 2014; Williams, 
2005, p. 5).
Still, the worry remains that the Critical Theory Principle – introduced by Williams to 
prevent his ‘make sense’ criterion of legitimacy from sanctioning political orders whose 
acceptance is based on (the abuse of ) their existing power – succeeds at the price of relying 
on a moralised definition of politics.
To put it another way, it is questionable whether we can anchor a whole theory of ideology 
to a conceptual claim about the nature of politics, given that the concept of politics is itself 
essentially contestable, and decontestation is achieved precisely through ideologies’ ability 
to highlight or even introduce a concept’s normatively controversial connotations (Freeden, 
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2013). We have no usable concept of politics (or freedom, or equality) until we decontest it, 
i.e. we flesh out its meaning by reference to a wider set of normative commitments. If, say, 
‘freedom’ means one thing to liberals and another to socialists, then ‘politics’ may just mean 
one thing to realists and another to moralists. The moralist may well maintain that politics 
can include raw domination, and that would be precisely why we need moral standards to 
guard against the excesses of politics. And so the question re-emerges as to whether the 
contentious normative connotations used by Williams in his decontestation of the concept 
of politics do not themselves originate in pre-political moral commitments.6 It looks as 
though Williams oscillates between admitting only those moral criteria mediated through 
the valuations of a political context and buying the critical-normative edge of his view of 
legitimacy at the cost of a lapse back into moralism, i.e. by admitting moral criteria and 
conceptual stipulations that are unmediated by a particular political context. We maintain 
that in order to generate a distinctively realist form of critical purchase which is compatible 
with the goal of contextual action-guidance, a stronger case for the compatibility of con-
textualist and critical commitments is required.
Radical realist ideology critique
If Williams’ attempt to dispel the worry of status quo bias while remaining true to realism 
fails, it fails in an illuminating way.7 So, before discussing options to fill in the gaps in Williams’ 
Critical Theory Principle, let us set out the desiderata for a successful realist account of ide-
ology critique.
The appeal of Williams’ Critical Theory Principle lies in the general thought that there is 
something wrong with trying to justify a sociopolitical system through a normative com-
mitment that is itself a direct product of the coercive power relations within that system. As 
Williams puts it,
if one comes to know that the sole reason one accepts some moral claim is that somebody’s 
power has brought it about that one accepts it, when, further, it is in their interest that one 
should accept it, one will have no reason to go on accepting it. (2002, p. 231)
Formulating the point in terms of the specific interests of some groups may be overly con-
troversial, insofar as it introduces further normatively charged elements into the picture, 
and might even have a not exactly ecumenical Marxian ring to it. Besides, one may worry 
about the familiar genetic fallacy: might the truth not happen to be aligned with the interests 
of the powerful, at least sometimes? But the general appeal of the point can be preserved 
by presenting it as more of a matter of epistemic bias: crudely, we do not let rulers set the 
standards of legitimacy for the same reasons that we do not let authors referee their own 
papers. We do not need to spell out exactly why the perspective of the authors or rulers is 
flawed, but only why it carries an epistemic risk. In other words, we need to work out what 
are the properties of beliefs8 such that, once they have been uncovered, undermine credence 
in the belief at hand.
The account of ideology we require to underpin our theory of realism as ideology critique, 
then, has three main desiderata: (i) it must avoid moralised versions of salient political con-
cepts (realistic desideratum), (ii) it must steer clear of the genetic fallacy (critical desideratum) 
and (iii) it must offer a broad framework for generating evaluative criteria for the social order 
in question (evaluative desideratum).
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The realist desideratum’s purpose is to allow the critic to distance herself methodologically 
from the object of critique. One may see this as a familiar move from Marxian Ideologiekritik: 
‘effective norms of right and justice (if correctly understood in their actual social function) 
are largely weapons of the oppressive class’ (Wood, 2004, p. 145). But again, we need not 
endorse that approach, though the position we defend is compatible with it. The point is 
simply that pre-political moral commitments such as Williams’ aspiration to ‘the most basic 
sense of freedom’ cannot be assumed to be free of the bias the critique is meant to uncover.
The critical desideratum addresses a related concern. Those who press the genetic fallacy 
objection correctly point out that implicit normative commitments tend to do the normative 
work, thus making the critic’s genealogical account of the ideological belief redundant. If 
what is wrong about belief in the legitimacy of a political order is that the order contravenes 
‘the most basic sense of freedom’, then the fact that the order is also the cause of the belief 
seems irrelevant. Williams proposes a solution to this problem:
… the references to causation should not treat the society and its members simply from outside, 
like a physical system, but consider the situation rather from their, possibly improved, point of 
view. We can introduce the following test of a belief held by a group: If they were to understand 
properly how they came to hold this belief, would they give it up? (2002, pp. 226–227)
That test is hypothetical, so to see whether it succeeds we need to unpack its conditional: 
‘If they were to understand that they came to hold this belief as a result of a violation of their 
basic freedom, then they would have reason to give it up’, or something of that sort. Note 
how the critical work, here, is done by the freedom violation, not by the causal story as such. 
The belief turns out to be flawed just because it supports a morally unacceptable use of 
power. The causal story is at most a heuristic to discover this sort of freestanding moral flaw. 
Our alternative account, then, will concentrate on epistemic instead of moral flaws.
The evaluative desideratum serves to make good on the realist claim to the practical 
orientation of political theorising. It is key for realism as ideology critique to take seriously 
the challenge that the epistemically focused account of ideology presents for the generation 
of evaluative criteria for the social order in question. While this challenge cannot be addressed 
fully here, it is necessary to provide at least a preliminary framework.
As anticipated, Williams’ residual moralism prevents his Critical Theory Principle from 
meeting both the realistic and the critical desideratum, and its way of meeting the evaluative 
desideratum turns out to be rather restrictive. A solution to those three related problems 
can be found with the help of recent developments in analytic philosophy of language and 
metaphysics, as well as of recent Frankfurt School Critical Theory. In broad outline, the solu-
tion is to retain the importance of the causal or genealogical element in the Critical Theory 
Principle by motivating it with epistemic rather than moral considerations. To carve out that 
position we make three moves. First, we change the object of the causal enquiry: we focus 
not on the process of belief acquisition, but on the formation of the meaning of the relevant 
concept. Second, we explain in epistemic terms why some beliefs are problematically resist-
ant to rational revision, and thus ideological. Third, we unpack the connection between 
diagnosis and critique, in order to explain the practical reach of the latter.
Sally Haslanger’s recent reformulation of the social constructionist critique of ideology 
provides the backbone of our version of genealogy. Haslanger draws particular attention to 
‘hegemonic naturalizations’, that is phenomena of valuation (preference formations, judge-
ments etc.) so internalised that they appear to be qualities of the objects concerned. Such 
‘hegemonic naturalizations’ are part of the fabric that allows social orders to function. They 
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are ideologies at least in this prima facie descriptive sense. Only a close scrutiny can bring 
to the fore how they shape our common ground, a structure of schemata and material 
resources that all too easily escapes our scrutiny. More specifically, Haslanger’s account of 
ideological social construction focuses on the meaning of the relevant concepts, and employs 
an externalist semantics to show that to uncover ideological hegemony we need to look 
not just at speakers’ ordinary understandings of concepts (the internal perspective), but also 
at the social factors that shaped the speakers’ grasp of the concepts (the external perspec-
tive). Concepts are embedded in social practices, so their meaning ‘is determined not simply 
by intrinsic facts about us but at least in part by facts about our environment,’ so our inves-
tigation of the concepts ‘will need to draw on empirical social/historical inquiry’ (2012, pp. 
395–396). This empirical inquiry, then, will provide a better account of how the concept 
works within the social practice. For there is a difference, on this approach, between the 
‘manifest’ and the ‘operative’ concept, i.e. between the concept as it appears to ordinary 
speakers as opposed to the concept revealed by an empirical investigation into the causal 
history of how the concept came to play the role it plays within the relevant social practice 
(Haslanger, 2012, pp. 92, 370). This practically oriented perspective looks not at ideas but at 
what people do by saying certain things (which reflects certain schemas of social knowledge 
they hold) and connects criticism of ideology (traditionally focused on ideas) with genea-
logical approaches (usually focused on practices).
So, for instance, Haslanger shows that generic statements such as ‘blacks are criminals’ 
are used in a way that reflects a specific form of social knowledge, embedded in a web of 
schemata and resources in which they are true. However, such generic statements are mis-
leading at the same time. They seem to be making a claim about the nature of an object/set 
of persons when the claim is in fact about its/their socially and historically developed position 
in the requisite social order. Haslanger (2012, pp. 468–470; see also chapters 13–16) illustrates 
this by considering the claim that Afro-Americans as such are (more) criminal (than other 
human beings) against a historical inquiry into the causes for the alleged connection 
between being Afro-American and being criminal (on which also see Alexander, 2010).
We draw three consequences from Haslanger’s intervention. The first consequence is to 
divide the process of criticism of ideology into two steps. The first step concerns problem-
atisations of the use of language in practice through a theory of pragmatics and semantics. 
The second step then introduces normative evaluations that guide the axiological ordering 
of valuations (see Haslanger, 2012, pp. 471–475). Haslanger thus offers an approach that 
allows us to clarify our understanding of ideology, without, however, resorting to commit-
ments to a politics of emancipation (or any other pre-political moral commitments) at the 
stage of analysis. Of course, at the stage of evaluation, commitments will have to come in 
but can now do so in a way that makes the process transparent and shows that potentially 
criticism of ideology can operate as a philosophical tool that has two distinguishable com-
ponents as against the view that in criticism of ideology methods and commitment are 
necessarily inseparable.
The second consequence is to bring so-called descriptive and pejorative understandings 
of ideology (see Geuss, 1981; pp. 4–21; Maynard, 2013) more closely together by broadening 
the view of ideology beyond questions of justification to questions of day-to-day action. 
Studying how language is used to make contested and in the widest sense politically/socially 
relevant evaluations invisible (or difficult to see) reveals that such language uses are not 
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only relevant to the justification of the social order, but are an integral part of acting within 
it.
The third consequence is to consider the question of ideology from a comparative point 
of view: if there must be ideologies as a common ground, the issue is not about moving 
from false consciousness to emancipation, but about trying to achieve a high level of self-re-
flection on the presuppositions on which the structures of a social order thrive or fail. At any 
point there will likely only be a limited range of alternative bases available for generating 
this common ground and fabricating it will not be up to the agents concerned or the political 
theorist ad libitum. The (public understanding(s) of the) purposes of the social order in ques-
tion will shape to a considerable extent the criteria for normatively evaluating the specific 
ideological formations of the common ground.
Haslanger refers to that sort of constructionist genealogical criticism as ameliorative con-
ceptual analysis (2012, p. 386). The idea is that even competent users of concepts may not 
be fully aware of their actual meaning in the externalist sense of the term, i.e. of the role 
played by the concept within the way in which the society makes sense of its world. Some 
might try to resist that sort of project by invoking the unreconstructed appeal of intuitions 
about meaning and ‘common sense’ grasp of socially or politically relevant concepts. To 
counter this objection, we can deploy Stanley’s (2015) theory of ideology as epistemically 
flawed, rational revision-resistant belief (the second move mentioned above). Consider 
Haslanger’s example of ‘Blacks are criminal’. She provides empirical evidence (the mass incar-
ceration history, etc.) to show that there is a difference between the manifest and the oper-
ative concepts of blackness and criminality. Now, according to Stanley, those resisting 
Haslanger’s ameliorative conceptual analysis even after being presented with the empirical 
evidence would be exhibiting an ideological belief in a pejorative sense of the term: ‘The 
distinctive feature of ideological belief is that it is very difficult to rationally revise in light of 
counter evidence’, because of its connection to social practices (2015, p. 184). Note, in fact, 
the affinity between this account of flawed ideological belief and Haslanger’s semantic exter-
nalism: ‘… while I theorize with a category of ideological belief … this does not mean that I 
think that being ideological is an intrinsic property of mental states’ (2015, p. 186). The point 
here is that there are social structures that provide epistemic obstacles to rational belief 
revision. In other words, resistance to rational revision is the product of social and political 
power used to inhibit our appreciation of evidence – the ideological flaw is an epistemic 
flaw.9
Another example should help cementing that point and showing what realism as ideology 
critique may look like. Consider Robert Nozick’s (1974) famous entitlement-based argument 
for the legitimacy of the minimal state (and against the legitimacy of other kinds of state). 
The argument relies on common sense notions of private property (including self-owner-
ship), i.e. notions that are in the common ground. However, a genealogical investigation on 
the common sense concept of private property reveals that the operative concept of prop-
erty differs from the manifest one. While the manifest concept is construed independently 
of the authority of the state, the operative one is in fact the deliberate causal product of the 
coercive power of past states: the political centrality of private property was introduced by 
ancient states to make the social world more legible and governable (to grossly simplify an 
argument developed in Rossi & Argenton, 2016). So while the manifest concept looks like it 
can be reliably used to adjudicate claims of state legitimacy, it turns out that the operative 
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one is epistemically suspect, given the state’s implication in its genesis. So Nozick’s argument 
cannot work as intended.
The identification of that epistemic flaw, then, rests on the plausibility of the causal 
account of the operative concept, which allows us to meet the critical desideratum. The 
debunking process does not invoke any moral notions: the flaw is epistemic, and so the 
realistic desideratum is met. That is how the origin of specific components of an ideology 
matters (de-naturalisation of hegemony, identification of sources of epistemic bias); but this 
alone does not offer grounds for the evaluation of a social system as a whole. To meet the 
evaluative desideratum, we need to locate those grounds. This is a central concern for a 
(radical) realist approach, for the following reasons: first, realists take seriously the task of 
providing orientation, which requires valuations and rankings of political states of affairs. 
Second, given that structurally problematic conceptual practices are already operative in 
thick evaluative concepts such as ‘politics’ or ‘democracy’, realism as ideology critique needs 
to make space for a self-reflection about the purposes of the polity. In short, realism as ide-
ology critique needs to make sure that it does not depoliticise concepts like politics or 
democracy through the analytical epistemology backdoor, thus failing to provide tools for 
radical self-critique.
Rahel Jaeggi takes on this question of generating criteria for evaluating what she calls 
‘ways of living’ (2014). Those depend on the kind of common ground that, as Haslanger has 
shown, is considerably stabilised through ideologies. Jaeggi’s approach incorporates the 
idea that the process of ideology critique does not only aim at changing the reality in ques-
tion but also at changing the norms and evaluative criteria at issue. This idea is based on the 
following understanding of ideology critique.
First, ideology critique combines diagnostic analysis and critique. It straddles normative 
and non-normative forms of theorising. This combination means that ‘ideology critique as 
analysis means to be critique, and not just a description of the status quo, and as critique to 
be analysis, and not just a set of norms with which the status quo is confronted’ (Jaeggi, 
2009, p. 280; our translation). Analysis is ‘not only the precondition of critique, but itself part 
of the critical process’ (Jaeggi, 2009, p. 270; our translation). Jaeggi’s interpretation directs 
attention to the entangled relationship between diagnostic analysis and criticism. The nec-
essary combination of analysis and critique is indicative of how ideology critique can over-
come the tension which characterises the realist relationship to the political context: whereas 
the component of diagnostic analysis covers the contextually immersed ambitions to rele-
vance, and critique covers the ambitions of realists for evaluation, only taking them together 
can redeem the practical ambition to guide future-oriented action.
Second, ideology critique is normative but not normativist, or moralist.10 For ideology 
critique thus understood to get started, an analysis of the relevant aspects of the political 
context in question has to be carried out in the way which realists have stressed on the one 
side of the tension, i.e. by concentrating on, to mention only a few central concerns, real 
political institutions, motivations of agents, and structural power relations. The normative 
element of ideology critique is already present therein through the concern with the inner 
normativity of the context in question, as e.g. highlighted through the difference between 
ordinary (manifest) and operative meanings of concepts. The normative element does not 
need to be externally introduced, hence it is not a normativist understanding of criticism 
(Jaeggi, 2009, pp. 283–284).
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Third, ideology critique combines the goal of epistemic clarification with the goal of 
political transformation and hence (especially if successful) is a kind of practical philosophy. 
The status of flawed or pejorative ideologies is peculiar in so far as they are at the same time 
true and false, that is they are at the same time ‘adequate and inadequate, appropriate and 
inappropriate toward “reality”’ (Jaeggi, 2009; pp. 275–277; our translation), because they are 
not simply a cognitive error, but an error which is caused by the phenomena of this ‘reality’. 
The point is that the critic of ideology has to criticise the perception of a political or social 
reality and at the same time this reality, too (Jaeggi, 2009, p. 276). Ideology critique is hence 
engaged in addressing ideologies, which are always at the same time a normative, a practical 
and an epistemic problem.
Realism as ideology critique thus makes a virtue of upholding a tension between 
objectivist and subjectivist tendencies with regard to the bases of its critical purchase. 
According to the understanding of ideology critique presented above, it cannot lean on an 
external standard of truth, but has to reconstruct the perspective from within the context 
at issue. This process is part of societal self-understanding, which connects to Raymond 
Geuss’ (2010b, p. 422) idea of political theory as ‘a kind of experimental science (of concepts)’. 
For the understanding of the generation of critical purchase (or critical distance) this means 
that it matters how the subjects to ideology view the situation. Their views, even if they turn 
out to be epistemically flawed, are in part constitutive of the understanding of the situation. 
Any transformation of the social order must initially address the agents from within a thicket 
of evaluative concepts. The outcome of ideology critique cannot be predicted, as the 
meaning of concepts (and often much else) will change in the process.
In short, realism as ideology critique uses a contextualist, immanent perspective, without 
thereby losing critical purchase. It starts from views within a specific historical context, but 
with the intention to transform both the views and the reality. In contrast to internal under-
standings of criticism, the diagnostic-critical process also affects the norms, the appeal to 
which might have initiated the process, in so far as they are not restored but rather 
transformed.11
When focusing on the epistemic properties of ideologies, it is important to consider the 
agency (limitations) of those subject to the social order. Here, Jaeggi’s account of criticism 
of ideology offers a way to incorporate these insights of analytic epistemology, semantics 
and pragmatics into a scheme of critical social and political theory. The understanding of 
ideology critique we have employed thus leads to a conception of realist political theory as 
a kind of practical philosophy. Its aim is to contribute to a process of transformation of social 
reality and its perception. In short, realism as ideology critique fuses diagnosis and critique 
so as to improve our grasp of the relationship between social reality and social norms.
Concluding remarks
Realism as ideology critique emerges from the preceding discussion as locally normative, 
but not normativistic: it allows checking particular claims to authority or legitimising ration-
ales against their own aspirations while opening up hermeneutic resources for challenging 
the norms, criteria, valuations on which these aspirations are based. It challenges the con-
servative bias in current liberal-realist thought and the anti-empirical tendencies of ideology 
critique. Realism as ideology critique in particular seeks to be an instrument for agents’ 
understanding of their political and social order, an understanding which may include 
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preference-formation, ideas of the good, a hierarchy of values, the parts of the order immu-
nised from the political process. This seems a promising way to get started on generating 
criteria against which to evaluate the use of concepts and relations of power in a social order. 
The critical distance needed in order to become clear about the current order needs to be 
wrested from a diagnosis of the status quo in which understanding and critique are inter-
twined. Taken together, those elements shall afford the tools to tackle the distinctly realist 
problem of distinguishing between good and bad coercion.
Notes
1.  The classical view is closely related to a long-standing realist tradition in political thought 
(Dyson, 2005; McQueen, forthcoming; Rossi & Sleat, 2014), and it wishes to return political 
theory to its traditional blend of descriptive and normative elements, against the ‘normativist’ 
(Prinz, 2015b) tendencies of mainstream contemporary approaches.
2.  Whether theorising without pre-political moral commitments is itself appealing is a question 
to do with the appeal of realism itself.
3.  For comparable points see Honig & Stears, 2011.
4.  This, however, does not imply that realism is exclusively a methodological stance, as the way in 
which political positions are supported through moralism and realism differ, and self-reflection 
is crucial here, as we argue below.
5.  And the various exegetic extensions of it that have been recently put forward (e.g. Hall 2015, 
Sagar, 2014, Sleat, 2013a, ch. 5).
6.  Moreover, for reasons we shall introduce in the next section, critics of ideology ought to be 
weary of merely descriptive conceptual analysis.
7.  Many of the texts in which Williams puts forward his political realism are posthumous and 
unfinished; so part of what we are trying to do here is simply taking Williams’ position in one 
of the directions it might have been taken, had he had the chance to develop it fully.
8.  We refer to all mental states that support politically salient attitudes and actions as ‘beliefs’, but 
we remain neutral on the exact nature of this type of mental content (Gendler, 2008; Stanley, 
2015, pp. 186–193).
9.  This epistemic flaw does not necessarily connect to conservatism and status quo bias. Radicals 
and revolutionaries could equally resist (and have in fact resisted) rational belief revision. 
However, our primary concern (if only temporarily) is with instances of resistance to rational 
belief revision that have conservative effects, given this paper’s focus on realism’s potential 
for overcoming status quo bias. Not only are such instances of ideology currently the most 
pervasive, reflecting the interests of elites, they are also particularly salient for probing the 
critical potential of realist political theory.
10.  ‘Normativism’ is a term of art of recent Critical Theory and Hans Sluga’s Wittgenstein-inspired 
criticism of analytical political philosophy (Sluga, 2014, introduction and chapter 1). It is close 
but not entirely overlapping with the realists’ ‘moralism’.
11.  This is a specificity of immanent critique (at its limit): ‘In contrast to internal critique, immanent 
critique is not only directed against the contradiction between norm and reality (the lack of 
the realisation of norms in reality), but it is rather directed against the internal contradiction of 
reality and of the norms which constitute reality.’ (Jaeggi, 2014, p. 291; our translation).
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